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Privileges and Immunities of Non-Profit
Organizations
Gerard D. DiMarco * and Ira 0. Kane* *
tAND NOW ABIDETH, FAITH, HOPE AND CHARITY, these three; but the great-
. est of these is charity."' This unsubtle reference to the word char-
ity describes superficially the field of non-profit or not-for-profit 2 corpo-
ration law.
The objective of this paper is not to delve into the intricacies and
complexities of the non-profit area, but rather to make manifest a few
of the many privileges and immunities granted to non-profit corporations.
Privilege of Tax Exemption
This subject is treated in detail elsewhere in this Symposium; and
we merely touch on it here.
The fundamental test for tax-exemption to non-profit corporations
is that there be present benefit to the general public sufficient to out-
weigh the loss of tax revenue.3 One recent example is the purchase by
Cleveland State University of three hundred acres of land near down-
town Cleveland, which prior to its acquisition was taxable and has now
become tax-exempt. 4 Although this will eliminate some of the city's tax
revenue, from the community standpoint it will aid in the development
of a much greater educational system and is thus pro bono publico.5
Sec. 501 (c) (3) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code enumerates the
requirements to be met by any corporation seeking exemption from fed-
eral taxation. It states that any corporation or other organization, no
part of whose net earnings inure to the benefit of any private share-
* B.S., John Carroll University; Second-year student at Cleveland State University,
Cleveland Marshall College of Law.
•* B.A., Hofstra University; Second-year student at Cleveland State University,
Cleveland Marshall College of Law.
[Note: This paper was not part of the Symposium. It replaces the paper on this sub-ject which was presented at the Michigan symposium.]
1 I Corinthians 13:13 (King James).
2 See Generally, Laws of N. Y. 1969, c. 1066, constituting c. 35 of the Consolidated
Laws of New York (McKinney's Cons. Laws of N. Y. Ann., Book 37, 1969). The
words "not-for-profit" corporation law statutes have been enumerated in N. Y. State's
statute: This N. Y. title seems to be a more appropriate designation than the more
commonly used non-profit title, simply because a not-for-profit corporation can
make a profit, although making a profit is incidental to its main function.
3 Philada Home Fund v. Board of Tax Appeal, 5 Ohio St. 2d 135, 214 N.E. 2d 431
(1966).
4 Blessed Are the Tax Exempt, Montage (WKYC-TV), Jan. 31, 1970.
5 Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations, Organizations and Associations 360 (2d ed., 1965).
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holder or individual, shall be exempt from taxation.0 Once a corporation
meets the requisites of § 501 (c) (3), it will qualify for an exemption
under § 501 (a). 7
Contrary to wide spread recent publicity the tax-exempt foundation
as a rule is not manipulated only for the performance of improper deeds.
Rather, the tax-exempt foundation represents a kind of power source
that allows individuals and corporations to engage in many proper activ-
ities in which they could not otherwise financially participate.'
However, there have been many situations wherein a perversion of
this privilege has taken place. The "feeder organization" represents a
prime example. Such an organization historically carried on a trade or
business for profit, and then paid this profit to a tax-exempt organiza-
tion.9 Such "feeder corporations" had a competitive advantage over
private enterprises as their tax-exempt status enabled them to use their
profits tax-free to expand operations, while their competitors could ex-
pand only with profits remaining after taxes. Such abuses of the tax
privilege resulted in the removal of the exemption for feeder corpora-
tions and the imposition of the Federal income tax upon them.'0
There are no general rules governing state and local taxation of non-
profit corporations. Generally, non-profit organizations (or at least char-
itable organizations) receive total or partial tax exemptions with respect
to most state and local taxes. To determine the exact nature of any ex-
emption, however, one must look to the particular statute.1
One example of such a state statute is § 5739.02 (a) (12) of the Ohio
Rev. Code, which states that the state tax does not apply "... to churches
and to organizations not for profit operated, exclusively for charitable
purposes, where no part of the net income inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual. .. ."
Real property tax exemptions are allowed in most states for certain
merely "non-profit organizations," but not to all such organizations. In
6 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 501(c) (3), "Corporations, and any community
chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, char-
itable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary or educational purposes, or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of
the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to in-
fluence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in (Including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any
candidate for public office."
7 I.R.C. of 1954, § 501 (A); "An organization shall be exempt from taxation under this
subtitle unless such exemption is denied under § 502, 503, or 504."
8 Baum and Stiles, Power Tools: Private Foundations and Public Corporations, 13
U.C.L.A. L.R. 938, 945 (1966).
9 Schonfield, Federal Tax Aspects of Non-Profit Organizations, 10 Vill. L.R. 487, 489(1965).
10 Note, Contribution of Feeder Corporations to Parent Foundation, 25 Wash. & Lee
L.R. 260 (Fall, 1968).
11 Supra n. 5, at 438. See also, Sierk, State and Local Tax Exemptions on Non-Profit
Organizations, elsewhere in this issue.
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some cases if a portion of the real property of a merely non-profit organi-
zation is devoted to a charitable use or purpose, it may be exempt; but
this depends entirely upon the particular state involved and its tax ex-
emption statutes. -1 2 Unfortunately, no uniform rules exist in this area.
In Bowers v. Akron City Hospital13 the Ohio Supreme Court ap-
plied § 5709.12 of the Ohio Rev. Code. The defendant, Akron City Hos-
pital, a non-profit corporation, had a parking lot adjacent to its building,
which yielded a profit of $19,000 per year. The issues were whether the
hospital, because it owned the parking lot, was entitled to a tax exemp-
tion as a result of its non-profit status, and whether the use of the prop-
erty rather than its ownership, should be a determinative factor in the
decision. The court ruled that the hospital was exempted from taxation
under the statute, as property belonging to a charitable institution as
long as the proceeds from the property were used solely to regulate exist-
ing conditions and provide for essential parking facilities.
The "use theory" was further propounded in a Nebraska case where-
in the court stated "it is the exclusive use of property which determines
whether the property is exempt from taxation." This court has long
been committed to the principle that "the primary or dominant use, and
not incidental use, is controlling in determining whether property is ex-
empt from taxation." 14
Tax immunities were originally granted to non-profit corporations
because of their pro bono publico character. However, in many situa-
tions there has been an abuse of this privilege, for the benefit of those
"in command," rather than for the public. This impropriety has led to
more stringent tax restrictions on private foundations noted in 1200
of the C. C. H. handbook on the Tax Reform Act of 1969 under the head-
ing "New Curbs on Foundation Activities," which states: "the Tax Re-
form Act substantially restricts the permissible activities of private
foundations by imposing a variety of sanctions-in the form of a new
series of excise taxes-on prohibited transactions." Several other articles
in this symposium will deal more in depth with this situation.
Exemptions From Collective Bargaining With Labor Unions
In certain situations non-profit corporations have been allowed an
exemption from bargaining collectively with labor unions. In Building
Service and Maintenance Union v. St. Luke's Hospital5 the union re-
quested that the court issue an injunction compelling a non-profit hos-
12 Bennett, Real Property Tax Exemptions for Non-Profit Organizations, 16 Clev-
Mar. L.R. 150, 164 (1967).
13 16 Ohio St. 2d 94, 243 N.E. 2d 95 (1968).
14 Lincoln's Woman's Club v. City of Lincoln, 178 Neb. 357, 133 N.W. 2d 455, 460
(1965).
15 11 Ohio Misc. 218, 227 N.E. 2d 265 (Ct. of Common Pleas, 1967).
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pital to bargain collectively. The Court dismissed the request for an
injunction stating that the National Labor Relations Act did not affect
this matter because Congress had amended the act and expressly elimi-
nated non-profit hospitals from its scope and that no Ohio statute com-
pels collective bargaining.10
A different result, however, was reached in a Utah case, 17 which
represented a proceeding by the Utah Labor Relations Board against
the Utah Valley Hospital to enforce the Board's order requiring the hos-
pital to bargain collectively. The hospital refused to bargain with the
Board, on grounds that the Board had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter and that it was subject to control only by Congress and the
N.L.R.B. The court stated that the field of labor-management relations
of charitable hospitals was not occupied by Congress so as to oust states
of control.18 It was further pointed out that states may control labor-
management relations in businesses which are engaged in interstate com-
merce unless Congress by statute limited such relations to federal juris-
diction. Thus, the State Labor Relations Board had jurisdiction to order
the hospital to enter into collective bargaining with the union.
Exemptions From Contributing to Unemployment Compensation Funds
Another of the privileges granted to non-profit corporations is ex-
emption from contribution to state unemployment compensation funds.
In a recent Ohio case 19 a "would-be" non-profit corporation which
operated a home for the aged and infirm sought to be relieved from hav-
ing to make such contributions, contending that it was not an "employer"
because it was "organized and operated exclusively for . . . charitable
purposes . . . the activities of which were confined exclusively to the
rendition of services for . . . charitable purposes." 20 The residents of
the home paid all or a large part of the cost of their upkeep. The only
issue was whether or not the home was an employer, within the meaning
of the statute. The court found that a corporation not-for-profit, which
operates a home caring for the aged and infirmed is not an "employer"
under § 4141.01 (A), Ohio Rev. Code, required to contribute to the Un-
employment Compensation Fund. Though the court stated that there
may be good reasons for not exempting charitable corporations from
contributing to the unemployment funds, it also concluded that statutes
must be strictly construed and that "legislative intent may be inquired
into only if the enactment is ambiguous upon its face." 21
10 Id., 223, 274.
17 Utah Labor Relations Board v. Utah Valley Hospital, 120 Utah 463, 235 P. 2d 520
(1951).
18 Id., 466, 523.
19 Carmelite Sisters v. Board of Review, 18 Ohio St. 2d 41, 247 N.E. 2d 477 (1969).
20 Id., 43, 479.
21 Id., 44, 480.
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Tort Immunity
At common law an unincorporated voluntary association such as
a labor union can not sue or be sued in its own name22 since such an
association had no status as a legal entity. Ordinarily, an action had to
be brought against the individual members of such an association "col-
lectively and conjointly." 23
In Ohio, the enactment of § 1745.04 of the Rev. Code abrogated this
common law rule. The statute states that "any unincorporated associa-
tion may contract or sue on behalf of those who are members and, in its
own behalf, be sued as an entity under the name by which it is com-
monly known and called." Similar statutes permitting legal action in
the association's own name now are found in California,
24 Michigan,25
Oklahoma,2 6 New Jersey,27 New York,2 and several other states.29 A
different situation exists in Massachusetts, where an unincorporated
labor union is still not a legal entity. No court judgment may be issued
for it or against it, in its own name. Such a judgment, except for a mere
declaratory judgment, may be entered only for or against its members.30
Tort immunity for non-profit corporations has been predicated upon
four basic theories.31 Cases espousing these theories are almost riotous
with dissent. Reasons are more varied than results to the degree that
they indicate something wrong at the beginning.32 The basis for the
various theories of tort immunity of non-profit corporations stems from
the courts' concern that the important functions of these corporations
not be crippled by expensive damage claims. 3
The "trust fund" theory is premised upon the reasoning that the
assets of the institution, created by the founders thereof, constitutes a
trust for particular charitable purposes. Therefore, if these assets should
be diverted to the payment of judgments that might be obtained in suits
against the institutions the purpose of the charity as well as that of its
donors would be frustrated and perhaps destroyed. In other words, the
essence of this theory seems to be that the preservation of the charitable
22 Kingsley v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 323 Ill. App. 353, 55 N.E. 2d 554 (1944).
23 Damm v. Elyria Lodge, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E. 2d 337 (1952); Kimball v. Lower
Columbia Fire Ass'n, 67 Or. 249, 135 P. 877 (1913); Koogler et al., Trustees v. Koogler,
127 Ohio St. 57, 186 N.E. 725 (1933); State v. Freemont Lodge, 151 Ohio St. 19, 84
N.E. 2d 498 (1949).
24 Calif. Code of Civil Prac. § 388 (1960).
25 Comp. Laws Mich. § 612.12 (1948).
26 Okla. Stat. Anno. Tit. 12 § 182 (1962).
27 N.J. Stat. Anno. Tit. 2A, C-64 (1952).
28 N.Y.C.P.L.&R., § 1025.
29 Oleck, op. cit. supra n. 5 at 28.
30 Ibid.
31 Id.
32 President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810, 812
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
33 Oleck, op. cit. supra n. 5 at 110.
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trust fund is more desirable than the right to compensation from the
funds for an injury inflicted by the operations of the charity.34 This
represents the basic rule found in most states. 3
The "waiver theory" holds that one who accepts benefits from a
charitable organization waives his rights to collect damages from that
organization for the torts of its agents.36 This argument, which has been
soundly repudiated in numerous decisions, is shown to be a fiction.3 7
The "exception to respondeat superior" theory holds that since a
non-profit organization obtains no direct benefit for its purposes from
its employees, it should not be liable for their torts.38 This theory is not
applicable to the commercial world where the master receives profits
from his relationship with his servants.39 This theory has been rejected
by many courts which point out that the doctrine is not a question of
profit, but "a consideration of the extent of the master's authority and
control over his employees." 40
Concerning the "public policy" theory, it has been stated that courts
must determine between the public's interest in maintaining institutions
free from liability and an injured person's right to compensation. Court
relying on the public policy theory advocate that individual rights must
be subordinated to the public good in order that charitable funds not bedepleted and that prospective endowments will not be discouraged to the
detriment of the public.41
Recently passed state statutes and court decisions have had a strong
effect in changing tort-liability immunities of non-profit corporations. 42
The Ohio case of Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, not long ago, is a prime
example, for it abolished the common law immunity doctrine as applied
to hospitals.43
Liability of Directors and Officers
Fundamentally, the directors and officers of a corporation are re-
sponsible to the shareholders or members for the management of the
property and business entrusted to their care.4 4 But the questions re-
34 Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230 (1950).
35 Howard v. South Baltimore General Hospital, 191 Md. 617, 62 A.2d 574 (1948).36 Milias v. Wheeler Hospital, 10 Calif. App. 2d 759, 241 P. 2d 684 (1952); DeGroat v.Edison Institute, 306 Mich. 339, 10 N.W. 2d 907 (1943); Holtfoth v. Roch. GeneralHospital, 304 N.Y. 27, 105 N.E. 2d 610 (1952).
37 Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 S. 344 (1940).
38 Oleck, op. cit. supra n. 5 at 110.
39 Nicholas v. Evangelical Deaconess Home, 281 Mo. 182, 219 S.W. 643 (1920).40 Waggoner, Decline of the Charitable Immunity Doctrine, 6 S. Tex. L.J. 207, 210
(1962).
41 Ibid.
42 Oleck, op. cit. supra n. 5 at 110.
43 Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E. 2d 410 (1956).
44 Pasley, Non-Profit Corporations-Accountability of Directors and Officers, 21 Bus.L. 621 (1966).
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main, what standard of care must be imposed on directors and officers
in the discharge of their duties, and to what extent, if any, must this
standard be relaxed in the case of non-profit corporations?
45
According to Professor Oleck, the high standard of care applied to
business corporations seldom applies to non-profit corporations.
46 This
observation was substantiated by Beard v. Acherbach Memorial Hospital
Association. In its opinion this court substituted "gross or wilful negli-
gence" for the ordinary prudent management test as a criterion for de-
termining liability.47 Thus, before imposing liability, the court "seems
to imply a more lenient standard than that applied to directors of busi-
ness corporations." 48
For a definitive statement regarding liability of directors and officers
in non-profit corporations one must consult the appropriate statute of
each jurisdiction. In California and Ohio directors of non-profit corpo-
rations are generally not personally liable for debts, liabilities, or obli-
gations of the corporation.
49
However, very common are statutes which prohibit directors (and
sometimes officers) from voting for or concurring in any unlawful dis-
tribution of assets, or the making of a loan to a director (and sometimes
to an officer),5o and impose liability on them for any losses incurred
thereby to the corporation or its creditors. The extent of such liability
is measured either by the amount of the illegal distribution or loan, or
by the injury caused to creditors, or by both.51
Indemnification of Directors and Officers
Some states52 have statutes recognizing the rights of directors and
officers to be reimbursed for expenses of litigation resulting from acts
performed in their official status.53 Usually, within the limits of these
statutes, the director or officer who is named as a defendant in an action
for alleged breach of duty may obtain indemnification for his reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees incurred in defending the action, un-
less he has been found guilty of misconduct or bad baith.
54
45 Ibid.
46 Oleck, op. cit. supra n. 5 at 279.
47 Beard v. Acherbach Memorial Hospital Association, 170 F. 2d 859 (10th Cir. 1948).
48 Chidla, Non-Profit and Charitable Corporations in Colorado, 36 U. Colo. L. Rev. 9
(1963).
49 Calif. Code § 9504 (1962); Ohio Rev. Code § 1702.55 (1968).
50 Calif. Corp. Code Ann. §§ 823, 824 (1962), made applicable to non-profit corpora-
tions by § 9002; Ohio Rev. Code § 1702.55 (B) (3) (1968).
51 Pasley, op. cit. supra n. 44 at 632.
52 Ohio Rev. Code § 1702.12 (E) (1963); N.Y. Not-For-Profit Corp. Law, § 722-725
(1970), Calif. Corp. Code Ann. § 830 (1962), made applicable to Non-Profit Corpora-
tions by § 9002.
53 Oleck, op. cit. supra n. 5, at 282.
54 Pasley, op. cit. supra n. 44, at 635.
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Contrary to the statutory requirement of most states, in a minority
of jurisdictions a director is held to be entitled to indemnification for the
expenses of a lawsuit only if his official acts were intended to preserve
the corporation's property.55
Urban Renewal Corporation
The clearance of slums and other blighted areas is necessary to pro-
tect the general welfare and security of the nation and the health and
living standards of its people.50 To implement such a rehabilitation pro-
gram, Congress has granted certain privileges to urban renewal corpo-
rations which are operated on a non-profit basis.
These privileges are enumerated in certain sections of the United
States Code 57 which make available to the urban renewal corporations
land and low-interest rate loans. All loans under these sections bear
interest at such rates as the administration determines to be appropriate,
but not to exceed 3% of the amount of the principle outstanding at any
time, per annum.58
Under § 1457 of Title 42, United States Code, any real property held
as part of an urban renewal project, upon the approval of the administra-
tion and subject to conditions as the administrator may determine to be
in the public interest, may be made available to (1) a limited dividend
corporation; (2) non-profit corporation or association; or (3) cooperative
or public body or agency.59
The effect of these statutes can be illustrated by Dorsey v. Stuy-
vesant where a private corporation, organized under an urban develop-
ment law, undertook the establishment of a city housing project and re-
ceived a financial subsidy, a tax exemption, and the privilege of eminent
domain. o
A further illustration of the privileges granted to urban renewal
corporations can be cited in § 1724.10 (c) of the Ohio Rev. Code which
concerns land conveyed to a community development corporation by a
political subdivision which is then sold by that corporation. Any excess
resulting from such sale is then paid to the subdivision after deducting
"the costs of such organization and sales taxes, assessments, cost of
maintenance, costs of improvements to the land by the community im-
provement corporation, service fees, and any debt service charges of the
corporation attributable to such land or interest."
55 Solimime v. Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A. 2d 344 (1941); Allen v. France Pack-ing Co., 170 Pa. Super. 632, 90 A. 2d 289 (1952).
56 42 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (1958).
57 Id., § 1452b, 1457.
58 Id., § 1452b.
59 Id., § 1457.
60 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E. 2d 541 (1949).
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Group Law Practice
Prior to 1963 a non-profit organization was unable to provide direct
legal counsel to its members. However, the well known Button,61
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen 2 and United Mine Workers0 3 cases
have altered this restriction.
In the Button case, a Virginia statute proscribed any arrangement
by which prospective litigants were advised to seek assistance of par-
ticular attorneys.6 4 However, the Court holding the application of the
statute unconstitutional stated "that the activities of the NAACP . . .
are modes of expression and association which Virginia may not pro-
hibit, under its power to regulate the legal profession." 05
Further meaning was added to this decision by the Railroad Train-
men case. This case, when before the Illinois Supreme Court, allowed
the union to refer legal problems of its members to union counsel with
the fee to be deducted from the recovery on a contingent basis rather
than paid by the association.66
In the United Mine Workers case the court held that first and four-
teenth amendment rights allow the petitioner (a union) to "hire attor-
neys on a salary basis to assist its members in the assertion of the legal
rights." 67
Following these three cases the group law practice privilege may
now be applied to non-profit organizations. The needs of our time have
shown that this area is necessary, so as to afford individuals associated
with the non-profit entities "equal justice under the law."
Conclusion
The status of the non-profit area is definitely a privileged one. Such
a status results from its pro bono publico character. However, the prob-
lem arises when the original purpose of the non-profit organization is
perverted or twisted so as to benefit those involved directly rather than
the public.
This type of situation must not be allowed to continue. There have
to be fervent efforts made to eliminate such "horseplay" and restore to
the non-profit area its pro bono publico character.
61 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
62 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar Assn., 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
63 United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois, 389 U.S. 216 (1967).
64 N.A.A.C-P. v. Button, supra n. 61 at 428.
65 Ibid.
66 In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N. E. 2d 163, 165
(1958).
67 United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois, supra n. 63 at 221.
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